Part II, Denying Xi, his worst instincts
Behavior Modification, not war
What follows is a recommended concept, to achieving what my research and analysis says is the most worthwhile outcome for Xi’s aggression. In order to understand today’s thoughts, it’s important to keep Part I in mind, just as much as what I recommend to be, the most effective approach.
As a disclaimer up front, I will do all possible to avoid the confusing and overly complex language of DoD, State and others within the national security community. Truth be told, Washington DC, especially within the national security community is best described as a “tower of Babel.” Even though it’s all in English, the bureaucratic language is most often unintelligible to those in sister agencies as well as different departments within the same agencies.
As I pledged when I began TAT, I’m trying to bring as plain of language as possible, so as to effectively work towards a solution, and concurrently allow as many Americans as possible and other readers to understand our threat situations. As that I’m fond of Einstein, the philosopher and brilliant physicist, you will see a couple of quotes today regarding, problem-solving. It’s something that the US has failed to do in the situation we now face with Xi’s aggression. This said, here are the foundational elements for Part II.
The problem: Xi’s aggression is a threat to global security by virtue of his declared intentions. The definition of his objective, deduced from narrative analysis, is predatory and a threat to the rules-based, international order. As defined yesterday, the three defining characteristics of his aggression are:
Military intimidation
Economic coercion
Massive human rights abuses
His strategic methodology is to use his signature project, the BRI/ OBOR (Belt and Road Initiative or One Belt one Road) to conduct his campaign of aggression through influence. The BRI and OBOR are also commonly called Silk Roads, as in Marco Polos travels. More simply put, he’s being a bully in a variety of extremely harmful ways. For the purpose of Part II, OBOR, BRI and SR, Silk Roads will be used interchangeably.
Yesterday I talked about how he wields influence all along the BRI in order to have leverage over any and all entities, including nations that may impede his march towards his stated 2035 and 2049 objectives. By this, I mean that he intends to be the regional superpower by 2035 and the primary, global superpower by 2049.
Military planners and strategists use a valuable term that I will use here as an exception to may avoidance of such terminology: CR or critical vulnerability. The official definition is: “Critical Vulnerabilities: Critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner achieving decisive results - the smaller the resources and effort applied and the smaller the risk and cost, the better. “
Ignoring this complicated talk, in lay terms this means; what is the one thing Xi must have in his strategy of global domination, that he cannot succeed without? For the purpose of this paper, the answer is simple. Xi must have a BRI that he controls. This is what makes it the prime target and the weapon systems that we must use, all are considered influence, not war. This just happens to be the set of weapons that the US national security community has and continues to fail at, for decades. This is another very long topic for another two- or three-part series in the future. Definitely not today.
Finally, let’s talk about the solution (s) to Xi’s threat. Let’s keep in mind, based on the introduction. If you remember nothing at all from today’s article, just remember the following in bold print.
The problem we are focused on solving, is the severe threat emanating from Xi, who wields bullying as a coercive tool of influence, in order to gain global domination by 2049. His primary weapons of influence are:
Military intimidation
Economic coercion
Massive human rights abuses
His methodology is to employ these weapons along the BRI, in all forms. This makes the BRI the target, and the best systems to impact the BRI in favor of diminishing the threat, are all based on influence, not combat. This is about as succinct as this complex threat can be expressed.
The bottom line is to modify Chinese behavior, not destroy China.
So, what exactly do I mean by wielding influence to modify Xi’s behavior. Let’s start with how I have long defined influence.
My version of a definition for influence relative to this paper: “Influence, done well, is achieved by a complex and intricate choreography of sustained actions, words and related activities, wrapped around a core narrative that continually modifies behavior in a manner supportive of natsec objectives.”
Cobaugh
From a career in uniform, mostly dedicated to influence, I also know with absolute certainty that the US national security community is incapable of effective, sustained campaigning with influence. In fact, “Ethical Influence is the broken-down, rusting vehicle of American power.”
Although our system for influence is irrevocably broken, if leadership has the courage to ignore the current dysfunctional system they created, we can achieve success. As with a popular saying at DoD, “we will have to build this airplane while we build it.”
So, what’s on the target list if all of the Silk Roads or SRs are the problem? This question is key to the beginning of such a campaign. My primary and first focus would include what the military calls “choke points” along LOCs. Phew, let’s decipher this mouthful.
LOCs, line of communications: A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations, and along which supplies, and military forces move.
The definition of LOC needs to be expanded for the purpose of successfully engaging Xi. I would offer that LOCs must also include all primary routes of commerce whether it’s overland infrastructure or SR, maritime SRs, digital SRs, airline/ airfreight SRs, space SRs etc. The bottom line is that if you cannot resupply the military that you use to intimidate others, it takes the bite out of one of Xi’s primary weapons of coercion. Wielding influence by commerce would also significantly impact Xi’s ability to wield coercive economics freely along the BRI.
Choke points: In military strategy, a choke point (or chokepoint) is a geographical feature on land such as a valley, defile or bridge, or maritime passage through a critical waterway such as a strait, which an armed force is forced to pass through in order to reach its objective, sometimes on a substantially narrowed front and therefore greatly decreasing its combat effectiveness by making it harder to bring superior numbers to bear. A choke point can allow a numerically inferior defending force to use the terrain as a force multiplier to thwart or ambush a much larger opponent, as the attacker cannot advance any further without first securing passage through the choke point.
Again, we must expand the definition far outside of just discussing the military. Primary choke points in the expanded version would be places like the Malacca Straits, the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and so on are good examples. Controlling ports, canals, operations along choke points allows Xi free reign to use mafia-styled tactics to control choke points. With most freight being hauled across oceans, losing control of choke points is unthinkable. For the record, we already have in most cases. Please see some of the embedded links regarding Panama, Suez and the Malacca Straits, above.
Those who control chokepoints control militaries and commercial interests equally. Just look at how painful and expensive it was when one of the world’s largest container ships was stuck in the Suez Canal in 2021. The impact was made more severe because it came in the middle of the COVID crisis and added more pain to an already compromised global logistics crisis.
When it comes to critical infrastructure, we and our allies and partners, are so far behind Chinese investment that it’s hard to imagine how so many failed to address this as a core national security threat, for well over a decade. As an example of just how far behind, let’s take a quick look at Africa, a critical continent for a variety of reasons.
This snapshot from the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee is but a small fraction of African FDI, Foreign Direct Investment. China, owns, operates or is building, 46 ports in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, some critical to global commerce.
Most don’t realize that the Arctic is also a high priority for Xi. The NSR, Northern Sea Route, shipping lanes when weather permits will become one of the most commercially critically commerce routes as weather continues warming. It’s the gateway for Xi to dominate commercial shipping, northern fishing and let’s not forget the massive amounts of Russian fossil fuels. China already is handling Russia’s infrastructure needs with joint commercial efforts planned in the near future.
This background merely serves to demonstrate the urgency required to begin addressing threats smartly, not with the same thinking we chose in creating these problems. Now is a good time for imagination that produces new, innovative ways of addressing current and future problems. Solving today and tomorrow’s problems with antiquated doctrine and processes is the most ingrained identity feature of the US military. Current thinking and processes are incapable of succeeding. We wouldn’t be in this mess if they worked.
So, if we are to target choke points and other critical portions of Xi’s BRI, with a long-term, sustained influence campaign, what does that look like? The diagram shown is a simple version for the purpose of influence so don’t get hung up on the details. It’s just to provide a concept. Yes, Venn diagrams are an excellent way to portray targeting with one major fault: when it comes to influence, no 2-D diagram is sufficient. Influence is a dimensional, not linear process. What we need are 3-D bubbles, and lots of them. Like ripples on a pond, any input alters the paths of the ripples, not just one or two.
What we do know, is that targeting LOC/ Chokepoints will be the bullseye on our diagram. Which arrows will work the best to achieve our objectives is where we currently off track.
At the moment, we have some elite level strategic communications and some mostly useless military posturing like FONOPs/ Freedom of Navigation operations and BTFs, Bomber Task Forces, displays of power. What utter nonsense when employed in a vacuum. Had these simple influence tactics worked, China would not be a threat. We’ve been doing the same thing for decades and expecting different results. Could they be helpful, maybe but not unless they are part of an influence strategy with multiple, sustained and well-coordinated efforts.
At the moment, we and other allies and partners do invest along the BRI but not as a focus. It’s generally speaking, country oriented rather than specific types of investment directly involving the BRI. For example, we may provide some sort of aid or program to a nation but its generic. Adding humanitarian relief is always a good idea but if Xi’s BRI is wielding too much influence in that nation, we need to also be encouraging investment that includes the ability to exude influence over Chinese attempted dominance.
Let’s say that Chinese manufacturing requires a certain product from the target nation, and they are willing to build the infrastructure to market it, then we or an ally, corporate or state need to dominate that particular industry and surrounding service industries. In short, symbiotic relationships make it a severe hardship on both sides if one or the other decides to become and abusive partner.
Within the INDOPACIFIC region, there are several organizations and/ or alliances that have the ability to cooperate on targeting the BRI in a more effective manner. There’s AUKUS, ASEAN, the QUAD and others, largely in the private and corporate sector. Embassies have business coordination offices. We need to encourage the business sector to invest along the BRI, for countless good reasons that would be beneficial to business, and national security.
I honestly believe that the cost of such security wouldn’t be more than most nations already spend in the region regarding managing Xi’s voracious appetite. It’s just that with smart targeting, the same costs generate better payoffs, for everyone. In the long run, effective non-kinetic targeting, saves costs and that should be the carrot everyone chases, including huge corporations whose bottom line has caused them to enable Xi rather than deter his aggression.
This topic could go on endlessly. There has already been a mountain excellent research dedicated to this threat and the issues surrounding it. That’s good. What we need now is to cut loose from antiquated process, terminology and tools and employ the one thing we perpetually fail at, ethical influence.
No matter what we do along the BRI, our success will be limited without a narrative-centric campaign that explains why we are acting in the manner that we are, to all audiences, friend or foe. These kinds of communications are absent in US policy. PAO’s whine that they report only. Nonsense! DoD will have endless meetings to discuss minutia that is irrelevant and based on analysis processes that were obsolete in the 1990s. Bureaucrats will scamper from meeting to meeting, notepad in hand but take months to make a simple decision, already obsolete by the time they do.
Getting the private sector on board to weave our national narratives into their corporate ones, when doing business in BRI impacted regions, would be a plus. Personal engagement at all levels is worth its weight in gold. True cultural training is a must for everyone, not the BS imposed on most troops by the Pentagon for the two decades in the war on terror.
I’m not talking about PYSOPS when I talk about ethical influence. I’m simply saying that all humans try to influence throughout most days in their lives. Whether it’s at the market, buying a car, backing a political candidate or issue, etc. There is a way to do this without the negative connotations imposed by scary sounding terms like influence or PYSOPS. Patriotic speeches around the Fourth of July are to inspire patriotic resilience, based on our national values. Yes, this is influence too.
The Pentagon and national security community must stop being terrified of using the word influence. It’s necessary and all nations employ it. As discussed in this and previous articles, Xi’s strategy of conquest is exclusively based on the negative aspects of influence. We can’t just start a war to make it go away. We must regain our former proficiency by updating and expanding training. I doubt that 60-70% of troops serving in a field that is part of the influence community even know what influence is.
At the moment, between Xi’s influence campaign against the world, Russia’s trolls and other influencers, extremists wielding influence against us, of all stripes etc., we are derelict in our duty by spending all of our funding on big ticket military hardware only. By doing so, we are ignoring the only real weapon of value on the battlefield of influence. It’s not one or the other. We need all of our resources, kinetic and non-kinetic. Too bad leadership refuses to acknowledge the only one of value against Xi.
Last but not least, I will attempt to weave a deeper dive on some of the topics of this article and Part I, in the coming months. This topic is dense and complex. It’s far too much for anything less than a book. I hope this helps us all better understand why we’re failing and what we must do, sooner than later. Later just may become too late unless we act prudently.