History:
Aleksandr Dugin is a prolific Russian author of various fascist political tracts. His daughter Darya Dugina, also known as Daria Platonova, was a Russian political figure in her own right, indeed sanctioned by Western countries over her Ukrainian views.
Dugin's father was a three star Russian military intelligence general, and Dugin even though initially a Russian dissident has always been in the GRU milieu.
Dugin's peak fame was perhaps in 2014 when Putin used some of his ideas to justify Russian military aggression in Ukraine, however Putin quickly removed Dugin from his circles. His academic appointment was canceled and he has never been photographed with Putin, nor held an official office.
Dugin's work has been influential in Russian military circles, but more so especially abroad. Russian intelligence outreach has brought in some interesting characters, though there's scant evidence of any operational links beyond information operations.
Dugin is associated with the wealthy Russian businessman/state figure of Konstantin Malofeev, whose media outlets provides Dugin’s platform.
Both Malofeev and Yevgeny Prigozhin funded Russian "separatist" activities in Ukraine in 2014, with Prigozhin continuing to fund Dugin's daughter Darya, including providing inauthentic troll farm social media support.
Dugin was not particularly powerful or influential with the Kremlin, though he has an outsize bogeyman reputation in certain uninformed quarters in the West:
Current:
Putin's famous essay on Ukraine in 2021 and his Ukrainian invasion of 2022 show him becoming closer in views to ultranationalists such as Dugin and Igor Girkin.
Putin has previously exhibited high tolerance for ultra patriotic right wing opposition, though as their stated views converged, the possibility of "alternative prophets" may have been a threat to Putin. This wasn't a problem with the cartoonish Vladimir Zhirinovsky, so Putin was able to lionize him.
The failure of the FSB's 5th Department in Ukraine resulted in the stinging blow of Russia's GRU taking the lead as the invasion of Ukraine faltered. There are rumors that Aleksandr Dugin may have criticized the FSB over this. If Yevgeny Prigozhin is indeed Dugin’s current patron, he is close to the FSB’s chief rival, the GRU.
Aleksandr Dugin was slated to be a speaker at the Russian "Tradition" festival at 6pm Moscow time on Saturday 20th of August. The festival was held at the semi rural Zakharova estate, once owned by Pushkin, outside Moscow. With luminaries such as Vladimir Solovyov speaking it could be expected that security from the FSB/FSO would be high. Note: The brackets around that period “defang” the URL. This is an infosec convention.
http://traditionfestival[.]ru/
Darya Dugina left the festival in a Toyota Land Cruiser, although it’s not clear if this vehicle belonged to her, or her father. Social media posts from individuals close to him indicate he was meant to be riding with her, but he made a last minute change of plans. Her vehicle exploded shortly after leaving the festival. There is a video of her father, standing near the flaming wreck, seemingly in shock. A friend of his named Markov has reported he is hospitalized, but it’s not clear if he had a heart attack, or just psychiatric distress.
A previously unknown group, representing itself as a revolutionary organization seeking to overthrow Putin, claimed the attack on Sunday. The claims were vastly amplified as Ilya Ponomarev, a former Russian MP, now a dissident in Kyiv, claimed the group warned him the attack was coming:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/21/ex-russian-mp-claims-russian-partisans-responsible-for-moscow-car-bomb
In a 27th July interview with the Times of London, Ponomarev had revealed his media group was extending to support kinetic operations by Russian domestic subversives:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/exiled-dissidents-take-on-putins-propaganda-machine-j7zmk7j6l
Discussion:
Putin often uses opaque methods to target enemies, and underlings sometimes use their own initiative to undertake acts that they know he'll have to accept. The festival seems quite unlikely to have been a venue an outsider group could have managed to infiltrate. It is not yet clear if the attack was meant to hit father, daughter, or both. Dugin’s sequestration in a hospital may indicate the state itself is in control. The people carrying this out were most likely in Putin's inner circle, with these potential motives:
1) A false flag provocation to blame on Ukraine.
2) FSB jealousy at GRU being seen as more competent and capable.
3) Regime members concerned they were becoming hostage to the "true believer" ultranationalists.
4) A broader attempt to gain control of the state’s propaganda efforts.
As with the apartment bombings of 1999, the assassination of Putin's mentor Anatoly Sobchak in 2000, or the assassination of Litvienko, the Kremlin is unlikely to clarify what really happened.